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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE ROGUE, a non- profit Corporation,

Petitioner and Appellant,
VS.

THE UTAH
LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AND SHARP M. LARSEN,
F. GE RA L D I RV I NE, AND
NORMA GILES THOMAS,
Constituting the members of said
Commission,

Case No.

12721

Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action in mandamus to compel the Liquor
Control Commission of Utah to issue Appellant's liquor
license upon a finding that Appellant complies with certain
provisions of the liquor laws of the State of Utah.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The District Court denied Appellant's
Mandamus and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Writ

of

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have this Court hold that the
District Court was without jurisdiction to make any decision
on the merits. In the alternative the Respondents seek to
have the decision of the District Court affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents basically agree with the facts as stated in
Appellant's brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
DISTRICT COURT
LACKED
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THIS SUIT.
The Third Judicial District Court reviewed the decision
of the Liquor Control Commission and affirmed the action of
the Commission. It was apparently never brought to the
attention of the court that it lacked jurisdiction over this
subject.
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, Hardy v.
Meadows, 71 Utah 255, 264 p. 968 (1928), nor conferred by
estoppel, State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72 P. 2d 626, 628
(1937). It is permissable to raise this for the first time on
appeal. Davidson v. Munsey, 27 Utah 87, 74 Pac. 431
( 1903).
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Section 32-1-32.6 Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1971)
provides for judicial review of action by the Liquor Control
Commission. The pertinent part of that section provides:
No court of this state (except the Supreme Court to
the extent herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to
review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision
of the commission, ... or to enjoin restrain or
of
interfere with the commission in the
its official duties; provided, that the writ of
mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court to the
commission in all proper cases.
Therefore, the District Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain any review or petition for writ of mandamus
involving a decision of the Liquor Control Commission. Any
attempt to excercise jurisdiction in such a case, or any
decision or action taken, is void. This should be decisive or all
other possible issues in this case.

POINT 11
THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
VALID ZONING ORDINANCE WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ISSUE A LICENSE TO
APPELLANT ON THE
BASIS OF
"NEIGHBORHOOD INCOMPATIBILITY."
The implication in appellant's brief is that the
Commission violated a "valid zoning ordinance" of Salt Lake
County in violation of Section 32-1-6(b). That implication is
totally incorrect.
First, the decision by the County Commission to allow
appellant to operate a private locker club and establish a state
liquor store was not a valid zoning ordinance. The law is clear
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Furthermore, the holding in In re Salt Lake County v.
Liquor Control Commission, 11 Utah 2d 235, 337 p. 2d 488
(1960) and the meaning of Section 32-1-6(b) do not, by any
stretch of the imagination, require the Liquor Control
Commission to establish a State Store everywhere the County
Commission says one is permissable. Section 32-1-6(b) gives
the Liquor Commission power to decide:
... the number and locations of the stores and
package agencies to be established in the State;
provided that a State Store or package
not be located in violation of any valid zoning
ordinance of any city, town or county of this State.
And subsection (I) gives the commission:
... exclusive power to grant and issue all licenses and
permits authorized by this act.
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POINT 111
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ENGAGE IN
ZONING WHEN IT REFUSED TO ISSUE A
LICENSE TO APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
"NEIGHBORHOOD INCOMPATIBILITY."
County zoning is a specific act arising out of decisions
made in strict compliance with Title 17 chapter 27 of the
Utah Code Annotated. It refers to the legislative division of
an area into districts having to do with structural design or
general use to which buildings in a general district may be
put. See Black's Law Dictionary, Rev'd 4th Ed., 1968. Such a
definition in no way implies that every time a Board or
Commission looks at the nature and character of a
neighborhood it is therefore looking at "purely a zoning
issue" (Appellant's brief, page 7).
The Liquor Control Commission is specifically required
to look at such considerations in Section 32-1-36.15, which
provides in part:
In establishing any state store or package agency,.the
commission shall give consideration to the following:
(a) The locality within which the proposed state or
package agency is to be operated;
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(d_) The extent cf present or anticipated tciurist traffic
w1th1n the area of the proposed
store or package
agency;
(e) The population in the area to be served by the
proposed state store or package agency;
(f) The geographical location of such state store or
package agency .... (Not to be near school church
etc.)
'
'
(g) Such other facts or circumstances which may be
considered material.

Furthermore, this section is not applicable to only
public State stores as appel Iant suggests. By its terms it
applies to "any" state store, and in the last paragraph of the
section, referring to the permissable number of state stores,
stores on private club premises are specifically mentioned and
exempted from these particular considerations.
This provision, along with the Liquor Control Act, was
passed in 1969, Laws of Utah 1969, ch. 83 by the same
legislature that passed the provisions for licensing private
clubs, Sections 16-6-13 et seq., Laws of Utah 1969, ch. 37.
All related statutory prov1s1ons must of course be
harmonized where possible, cf.Glenn v. Farrell, 5 Utah 2d
439, 304 P.2d 380 ( 1956), and these various provisions are
easily read together to complement one another as the
Legislature intended. The provisions of Section 32-1-36.15
clearly apply to any and all state stores, including those on
the premises of private clubs.
In examining the neighborhood the Liquor Control
Commission was not engaging in "zoning" but merely
following the mandate of the legislature.
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POINT IV
THE COMMISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS
AUTHORITY IN REFUSING TO ISSUE A
LICENSE TO APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
"NEIGHBORHOOD INCOMPATIBILITY."
In addition to the clear authorization to consider the
neighborhood given to the Commission in Section
32-1-36.15, supra, Point 111, the Liquor Commission is vested
with broad discretion in finding facts pertinent to
determining whether or not to issue a license.
It is not mandatory that the Commission issue any
particular Iicense to a particular applicant. Section 16-6-13.5
provides only that the Commission "shall have authority to
issue a license to a social club", not that it "shall issue" such
license. After providing for some of the requirements to be
satisfied before a locker club may be licensed and contain a
state store, Section 16-6-13.1 states that "if a state store is so
established, liquor or wine may not be stored or sold in any
other place than as designated .... " Such provisions clearly
indicate that the issuance of a license is not merely a
ministerial act occuring automatically on the occurance of
certain events.
The Commission has broad discretion to:
" ... conduct hearings to inquire into any matter
either of them deems proper concerning the
provisions of th is act (Liquor Control Act of .1969),
and regulations adopted thereunder,
title
chapter 6, insofar as the same
to social
clubs ... licensed thereunder, or to the right to store
or consume liquor on their premises .... " Section
32-1-32.1.
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And the commission may require the applicant for a liquor
I icense under title 16 chapter 6 to provide "any other
information the commission may require." Section
16-6-13.6.
It is clear by the terms of title 16 chapter 6 that the
issuance of licenses thereunder is to be "subject to the
provisions of ... the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969 and
regulations promulgated thereunder." Section 16-6-13.5 cf.
Section 16-6-13.1 ( 4) and ( 5).
Therefore, by the very terms of the statutes, as well as a
reasonable interpretation of the entire legislative purpose
evidenced in sections 32-1-1 et seq. and 16-6-13 et seq. the
character of a neighborhood and its compatibility with a
liquor licensee is a proper inquiry for the commission to
make in coming to a decision. The commission is given broad
authority to inquire into such matters.
It is true, as appellant states, that such broad authority
may not be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
but no such showing is made here. On the contrary the
record indicates a full consideration by the commission of
one of the factors the legislature obviously considered
significant in granting liquor licenses of any kind, the nature
of the neighborhood. On substantial evidence the commission
made the factual determination that the residents were
strongly opposed to the issuance of the liquor license, and
therefore denied the application. In doing so the commission
satisfied its statutory obligation.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court had no jurisdiction to review any
decision of the Liquor Control Commission and therefore
any ruling on the merits by that court is void, whether
correct or incorrect. Therefore it is respectfully submitted
that this Court rule accordingly. In the alternative, it is
submitted that the decision of the District Court in holding
that the Liquor Control Commission acted properly and
within its authority in denying appellant's application for a
liquor license is a correct interpretation of the applicable
statutes, and should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
Vernon 8. Romney
Attorney General
Frank V. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
William T. Evans
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondents
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